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ABSTRACT 
This paper quantifies the technical efficiency of German bus companies and elaborates on 
the  main  factors  influencing  their  performance.  Efficiency  is  measured  with  a  stochastic 
production  frontier.  We  test  for  the  impact  on  efficiency  of  ownership  structure  and 
participation at tendering. Furthermore, we investigate the influence on efficiency when a bus 
company is a part of a multi-product enterprise. The results yield insights how public bus 
companies  might  improve  their  performance  in  order  to  cope  with  the  changing  market 
environment. The mean technical efficiency of the investigated bus companies is around 87 
percent.  Bus  companies  with  participation  at  tendering  show  a  significantly  higher  mean 
efficiency  than  other  companies.  The  ownership  structure  has  no  influence  on  technical 
efficiency.  
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1.  Introduction 
Germany’s local public bus transport markets remain dominated by small, publicly-owned 
companies with monopoly power. In most municipalities, local authorities offer the services of 
a  publicly-owned  bus  company,  sometimes  supported  by  private  subcontractors. 
Traditionally,  competition  has  been  virtually  non-existent.  However,  local  bus  companies 
have  come  under  pressure  to  enhance  their  performance.  As  public  deficits  rise,  the 
authorities are becoming increasingly reluctant to offset losses incurred by their own bus 
companies. Moreover, some municipalities have started to tender out at least some of their 
bus services. Furthermore, private international transport operators have recently been able 
to gain access to some local bus markets by acquiring private (sub-) contractors.  
This paper evaluates the level of technical efficiency of German bus companies and some 
potential  determinants  with  a  Stochastic  Frontier  Analysis  (SFA)  approach,  which  is  a 
parametric benchmarking method. In order to investigate  some determinants  of technical 
efficiency, we apply the production frontier methodology developed by Battese/Coelli (1995).
1 
Various  international  studies  investigate  the  eff iciency  of  urban  public  transport.
2 
Hirschhausen/Cullmann (2008) use a Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to analyze German 
bus companies. Overall, they find very low efficiency scores. Other studies investigate the 
determinants of efficiency with a stochastic production function. Roy/Yvrande-Billon (2007), 
for example, show  that  private operators outperform public ones   in terms of efficiency. 
Furthermore, their results imply that operators subject to  cost-plus contracts exhibit a lower 
level of technical efficiency than those subject to  fixed-price agreements. The most recent 
study of the German bus market is from Walter (2009), who analyzes cost efficiency and 
finds that a high degree of outsourcing increases cost efficiency.  
2.  Methodology 
For our analysis, we follow Roy/Yvrande-Billon (2007) and use the stochastic frontier model 
proposed by Battese/Coelli (1995). The stochastic production frontier is defined by:
3 
(1)                                              
    denotes the production level for the  -th firm at the  -th observation.     is a vector of 
inputs and other explanatory variables (environmental variables).   is a vector of unknown 
parameters  to  be  estimated.       are  stochastic  variables  which  represent  uncontrolled 
random shocks in the production process. The     are assumed to be            
   random 
                                                 
1 See Battese/Coelli (1995) and Coelli (1996). 
2 See De Borger et al. (2002) for a brief overview. 
3 See Battese/Coelli (1995). 3 
 
errors, independently distributed of the    .     are non-negative random variables          , 
which accounts for the fact that the output of a company must lie either below or on the 
production frontier. They capture the technical inefficiency of the firm. It is assumed that the 
    are independently distributed as truncated normal           
  .  
The technical inefficiency effect is specified as: 
(2)                                     
    is a vector of explanatory variables associated with the technical inefficiency of firms over 
time.   is a vector of unknown parameters to be estimated.     is a random variable defined 
by truncating of the normal distribution with a zero mean and variance   
   at      . 
  and   are estimated simultaneously with the method of maximum likelihood. The likelihood 
function is expressed in terms of the variance parameters,        
      
  and       
    . 
The technical efficiency of production for the  -th firm at the  -th observation is: 
(3)                                                  
For the analysis, we choose a transcendental logarithmic function (translog function) as the 
analytical form for the production function.
4 The translog function is a flexible function that 
does  not  restrict  a  bus  company’s  production  technology.  There  are  no  restrictions  on 
substitution  elasticity  and  elasticity  of  scale.  We  use  the  following  translog  production 
function: 
(4)                                        
 
                
 
             
                                                            
The output     is measured in vehicle-kilometres. The main inputs for bus companies are 
labour, capital and energy.
5 Because data about energy is not available, we follow Gathon 
(1989) and use labour and capital as inputs.     represents  the  capital  employed  and  is 
measured as the number  of vehicles. Labour     is measured as the number of full-time 
employees. We follow Roy/Yvrande-Billon (2007) and additionally use two control variables. 
The  first  is  the  network  length      ,  which  is  a  proxy  of  the  exogenous  environmental 
characteristics of the network. We assume that the network length has a positive influence 
on the output measured in vehicle kilometres.  The number of inhabitants in the supplied 
area       is  the  second  control  variable.
6  Furthermore, we assume that th e number of 
inhabitants in the supplied area exerts a positive influence on the output. 
                                                 
4 See Christensen et al. (1973) and Gathon (1989). 
5 See De Borger et al. (2002), p. 18. 
6 See Roy/Yvrande-Billon (2007), pp. 271f. 4 
 
Output measurement can be based on supply (vehicle- or seat-kilometres) or on demand 
(passenger-kilometres).
7 Data on supply can easily be collected and correlates highly with 
the inputs. However, such output measures do not reflect the actual use of the services 
offered, which, of course, is accounted for by demand -oriented output measures. However, 
the  efficiency  scores  obtained  from  models  with  output  based  on  demand,  can  be 
misleading, as demand can only be influenced to some degree by the bus company.
8 Taking 
into account the focus of this paper, we therefore use vehicle -kilometres as the output -
measure. 
The technical inefficiency effects are defined by equation (5): 
(5)                                                             
  ,      and    are variables that do not impact on the production technology per se. They 
explain why some bus companies are more or less efficient than other bus companies. The 
variables are defined as follows: 
-     is a dummy variable that assumes the value 1, if the bus company participates at 
tendering and 0 otherwise. 
-       is a dummy variable that assumes the value 1, if the bus company is a private 
company and 0 otherwise. A private bus company is defined as one with a minimum 
private shareholding of 50%. 
-     is a dummy variable that assumes the value 1, if the bus company is a part of a 
multi-product enterprise operating in multiple-utility sectors such as transport, water, 
energy and 0 otherwise. 
3.  Data 
The statistics from the Association of German Transport Companies (Verband Deutscher 
Verkehrsunternehmen  (VDV))  provide  data  on  bus  companies.
9  The  dataset  is  an 
unbalanced panel for the years 2004 to 2008. Companies offering services in  both local bus 
and rail transport are deleted from the data set. Information about participation at tendering 
was obtained through interviews and online resources. Information about ownership structure 
and  multi-utility  involvement  was  obtained  from  the  annual  reports  of  the  companies 
themselves and from the Handbook of Transport Companies in the VDV.
10 The unbalanced 
panel consists of 692 observations. 154 bus companies are included with a mean of 4.5 
                                                 
7 See Berechman/Giuliano (1985), p. 318. 
8 See De Borger et al. (2002), pp. 19f. 
9 See Verband Deutscher Verkehrsunternehmen (various years a). 
10 See Verband Deutscher Verkehrsunternehmen (various years b). 5 
 
observations per company. The number of observations per year ranges from 133 (in 2005) 
to 145 (in 2008).
11 
The number of full-time employees     obtained from the VDV does not include the number 
of full-time employees who work in the subcontract bus companies. The vehicle-kilometres of 
each  company     ,  however,  are  stated  inclusive  of  the  supply  of  subcontractors.  We 
address this problem by estimating the number of the firms’ own and outsourced full-time 
employees  (    . We use  a  very  conservative  approach  and  assume  that subcontractors 
need as many full-time employees per bus as the contracting bus company: 
(6)           
   
           
                          .           
We then estimate Equation (3) with    .  
Descriptive statistics of the variables are provided in Table 1. In our sample, 9 % of the bus 
companies participate at tendering and nearly 13% of the bus companies are private. 34% 
are a part of a multi-product enterprise operating in multiple-utility sectors, such as transport, 
water and energy.  
 
Table 1: Describtive statistics 
  Min.  Max.  Mean  Median  Std. Dev. 
Vehicle-kilometres in thousands      185  45,409  5,734  3,341  7,266 
Vehicles      3  1,352  131  73  191 
Estimated full-time employees        8  2,543  281  146  398 
Network length       13  17,953  1,361  500  2,457 
Inhabitants       13,552  5,412,865  390,103  124,178  814,789 
        0.09     
          0.127     
        0.344     
 
                                                 
11 The exact data structure is as follows: 2004: 137, 2005: 133, 2006: 143, 2007: 134 and 2008: 145 observations. 6 
 
4.  Results 
The maximum-likelihood estimates are reported in Table 2. The model was estimated using 
the FRONTIER 4.1 software.
12 The local point of approximation is the sample mean, that is, 
the  independent  variables  are  evaluated  at  their  sample  mean  values.  The  first -order 
coefficients (   and     ) can be interpreted as elasticities with respect to the factors   and 
    for the mean bus company.
13 The first-order coefficients yield the expected signs and are 
statistically significant at the 1% significance level. The sum of these coefficients represents 
the scale elasticity.  If the inputs are increas ed by 1%, t he output increases by 0.74 %. 
Therefore, the mean-bus company operates with decreasing returns to scale. The elasticity 
of scale for the bus companies in our sample ranges from 0.63 to 1.14 with an average value 
of 0.85. 
The coefficients of network length       and for the inhabitants in the supplied area       are 
statistically  significant  and  positive.  Network  length  and  the  number  of  inhabitants  in  the 
supplied area have a positive influence on the output measured in vehicle kilometres. 
The parameter   is statistically different from zero and close to one, which indicates that the 
inefficiency effects (productive inefficiency) are important relative to the random noise term.
14 
The null hypothesis that there are no inefficiency effects                                      
   is rejected at a p-value of 0% (the likelihood-ratio test statistic is 86.001). The estimated 
coefficient for “part of a multi-product enterprise”       is positive and significantly different 
from zero at the 1% level. Bus companies that are part of a multi-utility-owned enterprise are 
less efficient than others. One explanation of this inefficiency may be that losses incurred by 
the transport division of these enterprises can be compensated for by monopoly or oligopoly 
profits from other utility services. The coefficient     is negative and significantly different 
from zero at the 1% level. Bus companies which participate at tendering are more efficient 
than other bus companies. Participation at tendering seems to increase efficiency, or it may 
be that more efficient bus companies participate at tenders. The estimated coefficient       is 
negative,  but  not  statistically  different  from  zero.  Ownership  structure  seems  to  have  no 
influence  on  the  estimated  inefficiency  of  a  bus  company.  At  first  glance,  that  might  be 
surprising,  as  privately  owned  companies  are  generally  perceived  as  more  efficient  than 
publicly owned ones. Looking at empirical studies on the issue, ambiguous results can be 
found. Based on a comprehensive review of the relevant literature, Shirley/Walsh (2001) 
come to the conclusion that ownership is important in competitive markets and that private 
companies generally outperform public companies within this market structure. However, in 
                                                 
12 See Coelli (1996). 
13 See McCarthy (2001), pp. 168f. 
14 See Roy/Yvrande-Billon (2007), p. 269 and Battese/Coelli (1995), p. 330. 7 
 
monopoly markets, there is no clear evidence that private companies are more efficient than 
public ones. Taking these results into account, the lack of significance of the coefficient       
in our study might be attributed to the fact that most companies in our sample operate in 
monopoly markets without tendering, in which even privately owned companies have weak 
incentives to be efficient.  
 
Table 2: Regression results 
Parameter  Estimate  Standard-Error  p-value 
    2.024  0.017  0.0000 
    0.474  0.042  0.0000 
      0.264  0.033  0.0000 
     -0.195  0.041  0.0000 
         -0.052  0.049  0.2886 
       0.086  0.038  0.0244 
     0.069  0.011  0.0000 
     0.109  0.016  0.0000 
    -0.942  0.319  0.0032 
     -2.460  0.941  0.0092 
       -0.090  0.093  0.3329 
     0.459  0.117  0.0001 
       
      
   0.204  0.038  0.0000 
      
      0.885  0.028  0.0000 
       
log likelihood function  106.328     
 
The estimated efficiencies are limited to 0 and 1. A value of 1 means full technical efficiency. 
The  difference  between  1  and  the  estimated  efficiency  can  be  interpreted  as  technical 8 
 
inefficiency. The mean efficiency of the German public bus transport industry is 0.87. Other 
analyses using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) have yielded even lower values.
15 The 
mean efficiencies for bus companies, with participation at tendering and without participation 
at tendering, are given in Table 3. The first group yields a higher mean efficiency (0.952 
compared 0.857). Bus companies which are  not  part of multi-product enterprises yield a 
higher  mean  efficiency  (0.885  compared  0.827).  The  result  suggests  that  private  bus 
companies are more efficient than public bus companies, but the coefficient of the variable 
      is not significantly different from zero. 
 
Table 3: Mean Efficiency 
Bus companies…  Mean 
with participation at tendering  0.952 
without participation at tendering  0.857 
which are part of multi-product enterprises  0.827 
which are not part of multi-product enterprises  0.885 
which are private operators  0.886 
which are public operators  0.862 
 
5.  Discussion and Conclusion 
This  paper  applies  a  stochastic  production frontier  to  examine  the technical  efficiency  of 
German Public Bus Transport. It is clear that further research needs to be conducted with our 
data set  and that it is necessary to deal with  the issues of outsourcing and unobserved 
heterogeneity.  However,  the  analysis  demonstrates  that  German  Public  Bus  Transport 
exhibits  a  low  level  of  technical  efficiency.  Participation  at  tendering  influences  technical 
efficiency positively, and bus companies that are part of a multi-utility-owned enterprise are 
less  efficient  than  other  bus  companies.  Tendering  improves  technical  efficiency.  The 
ownership structure of companies in our sample seems to have no influence on efficiency. 
This might be attributed to the fact that most companies in our sample, whether private or 
public, have been granted monopoly rights in their markets. In monopoly markets, however, 
                                                 
15 See, for example, Hirschhausen/Cullmann (2008) or Hartwig/Scheffler (2009). 9 
 
there are weak incentives for both private and public companies to be efficient. This result is 
consistent with those of other studies, which show that the ownership issue is more important 
in competitive environments than in monopoly markets. 
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